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In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Think-
ing," Heidegger discusses the need to move beyond prior 
philosophical thinking to the determination of the 
proper matter of thinking. In first encountering this 
idea, which has the form of an injunction to think the 
philosophical tradition in a way which enables us to 
"overcome" that tradition, one may be seized with the 
inclination to lodge the kind of thoroughgoing critique 
of the tradition which puts one in position to bury and 
forget it as if it were a bad dream. Some self-styled 
"Heideggerians" employ this tack in an attempt to ex-
ponge from philosophy the notions of Subjectivity and 
presence, as if these notions were nothing more than an 
elaborate and painfully embarrassing mistake which 
should simply be forgotten; then the "task" of philoso-
phy, if there still is one, is to articulate a realm of 
"non-metaphysical" discourse in which anything goes as 
long as it does not involve the dirty words "Subjectiv-
ity" and ."presence." But at best such a posture bears 
only a superficial resemblance to Heidegger's position. 
While Heidegger does seek to "overcome" the tradition 
and its fundamental presuppositions about Being, he is 
not enjoining us to jettison the tradition but rather 
to appropriate it productively, to transform its con-
cepts in the way in which concepts become aufgehoben in 
Hegelian dialectic. It is in this spirit that Heideg-
ger devoted his life to the study of the history of 
philosophy. (Here we should bear in mind that Heideg-
ger considered philosophy to be a peculiarly occidental 
pursuit.) And it is in this spirit that we must inter-
pret Heidegger's reflection on aletheia in "The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking:" if we try to 
think unconcealment in isolation from the traditional 
understanding of Being as presence, and if we try to 
understand our own being in isolation from traditional 
concepts of human being which culminate in the modern 
notion of Subjectivity, then we fail to think the mat-
ter of philosophy authentically and end up engaging in 
meaningless word-play. It is true that on Heidegger's 
account the tradition has gone astray, but it is the 
very crux of his account that we are destined to do so. 
And perhaps the most conspicuous example of this er-
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rancy is Heidegger's own attempt in Being and Time to 
equate aletheia and truth. In "The End of Philosophy 
and the Task of Thinking," Heidegger says that "(tjo 
raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as 
such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. 
For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to 
call aletheia in the sense of opening, truth."1 If we 
decide that the equating of aletheia and truth amounts 
to no more than a terminological blunder on Heidegger's 
part, then we ourselves are making a serious mistake. 
If we are to understand the shift in Heidegger's think-
ing about aletheia in Being and Time, we must produc-
tively appropriate that earlier thinking rather than 
turn our backs on it. It is for this reason that the 
bulk of the following discussion is devoted to an exam-
ination of the position which Heidegger at least seems 
to abandon in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking." 
This discussion is divided into three parts. The 
first considers some of Heidegger's remarks concerning 
truth in Being and Time, and relies on several of 
Heidegger's Marburg lectures as a way of filling out 
Heidegger's position. The second part sets<up Heideg-
ger's claim in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" that the 
Platonic corpus reflects a shift in the essence of 
truth from unconcealedness to correctness or corre-
spondence. And the third part examines Heidegger's 
claim in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking" that he was wrong to say that the essence of 
truth underwent a transformation in the early Greek 
world, and the accompanying claim that it was a mistake 
to equate aletheia as unconcealedness with truth in the 
first place. While at first glance this shift in Hei-
degger's position might seem to be a mere redefinition 
of terms, I want to say that it forces us to rethink 
the very notion of clearing in Heidegger's writings. 
In Being and Time Heidegger conceives of the clearing 
(Lichtung) as a finite human one; on this view, the 
disclosedness of Being to Dasein is "phenomenological 
truth,"2 and the discoveredness of beings is also a 
kind of truth.1 But in his later writings the term 
"truth" is reserved for the traditional notion of cor-
rectness, and Dasein's disclosedness and discursive ar-
ticulation of beings are no longer considered to be 
"true" but rather ground the possibility of the truth 
and falsity of assertions or representations.* At the 
same time, the clearing is no longer conceived as one 
which can be so interpreted that it reveals to us the 
meaning of Dasein's Being and the meaning of Being gen-
erally; rather, the shift in Heidegger's conception of 
truth brings with it a conception of the clearing which 
emphasizes the mysterious, non-totalizable, non-
representable character of Being; that shift signals an 
attempt to "overcome" metaphysics, to subordinate the 
"calculative thinking" characteristic of the technolog-
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ical age to the "meditative thinking" which seeks to be 
open to the mystery of Being.* 
I. Heidegger's Concept of Truth in "Being and Time" 
From the start Heidegger's discussion of truth is 
influenced by Aristotle; this is already apparent in 
paragraph 7(b) of Being and Time when Heidegger discus-
ses the meaning*of the term logos. Heidegger says that 
"the basic meaning of logos is 'discourse'" and adds 
that "11logos does not mean judgement', and it cer-
tainly does not mean this primarily—if one understands 
by 'judgement' a way of 'binding' something with 
something else, or the 'taking of a stand' (whether by 
acceptance or by rejection)" (BT 55ff). Here Heidegger 
is thinking of Aristotle's view that assertion or 
judgement (logos apophantikos) is a branch of the 
broader logos semantikos. That for Aristotle discourse 
is in its broadest characterization semantic, means 
that discourse makes beings manifest or lets them be 
seen. "The function of discourse is deloun—the making 
manifest of beings."' Discourse makes manifest what 
the discourse is about, and makes it manifest to those 
engaging in the discourse (BT 56). Apophantic logos is 
a special kind of making manifest, namely the kind 
which occurs in informing people or in pointing things 
out. When Heidegger discusses apophansis in' paragraph 
33 of Being and Time, he calls it a predicative point-
ing out which informs. Here pointing out means letting 
a being be seen from itself, and this pointing out has 
a predicative structure. The defining which occurs in 
predication does not first discover that which shows 
itself as such, but limits seeing to this self-showing 
something in order to make "that which is manifest ex-
plicitly manifest in its definite character" (BT 197). 
And the assertion informs insofar as it shares with 
another the being which has been thus pointed out in 
its determinateness. This determination of a being in 
assertion takes the form of a "dimming down" (abbleden, 
Entblendung) to, e.g., "that hammer there;" the posit-
ing of a subject, a predicate,' and the togetherness of 
the two is apophansis (BT 197). 
Aristotle says that it is the synthetic structure 
of assertion which makes it possible for an assertion 
to be true or false. Unlike aisthesis (sense percep-
tion) and noesis (mental perception of simple natures), 
which can either disclose (present) or fail to do so, 
the articulation of concepts conditions the possibility 
of error for Aristotle. Only at the level of dianoesis 
or discursive thought does the possibility arise that 
things will be combined in thought which are not com-
bined in reality. And insofar as words are for Aristo-
tle symbols of mental experience ("Spoken words are the 
symbols of mental experience and written words are the 
symbols of spoken words") 7 the truth of assertions is 
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for Aristotle doubly founded: such truth, which per-
tains to the predicative use of language, presupposes 
both perception of essences or simple objects of 
thought and the presence of discursive thought. 
Here it will be helpful to summarize Aristotle's 
notion of truth briefly. Aisthesis and noesis are al-
ways true; they cannot be false, but at most can fail 
to occur. The possibility of falsity depends on syn-
thesis, which is found in discursive thinking (dianoe-
sis) and in a particular use of language (logos) which 
represents that thinking, namely in assertion (logos 
apophantikos). 
Against the background of Aristotle's notion of 
truth as logos apophantikos, Heidegger weaves the no-
tion of assertion into his account of human Dasein. 
While for Aristotle the synthesis-structure of asser-
tion makes it possible for assertions to be false as 
well as true, for Heidegger (and implicitly for Aristo-
tle) the synthetic structure of assertion is grounded 
in the function of assertion as letting-be-seen-by-
pointing-out (BT 56). More generally, the possibility 
of assertion being true or false is grounded for Hei-
degger in the function of discourse as letting things 
be seen or as making things manifest. It is this move 
which is key for understanding Heidegger's appropria-
tion of Aristotle. 
Heidegger's departure from Aristotle can best be 
seen in the section on logos in paragraph 7 of Being 
and Time. There Heidegger suggests that the basic 
meaning of truth in the sense of aletheia is not cor-
respondence but rather letting be seen (Sehenlassen) or 
discovering (Entdecken) (BT 56ff). For Heidegger, and 
according to him for the philosophers to whom he refers 
somewhat ambiguously as "the Greeks," logos is not the 
primary locus of truth. But while Heidegger has argued 
that the primary locus of truth for Aristotle is the 
complex of aisthesis and noesis, Heidegger's own move 
is quite different. Because on Heidegger's account 
bare staring is the most derivative kind of experience, 
we have to expect his account of letting things be seen 
to be radically different than Aristotle's (BT 189f). 
In fact Heidegger turns Aristotle's ontology on its 
head. While Heidegger retains Aristotle's insight that 
the truth of assertions must be grounded in a more pri-
mordial sense of truth, he appeals not to any variety 
of eidetic intuition but rather to the disclosedness of 
Dasein and his own notion of Dasein's discursive or in-
terpretive activity. The notion that meaningful exis-
tence could begin with bare perceptual staring, whether 
this staring be sensory or eidetic, is anathema to 
Heidegger. 
On Heidegger's view assertion is not only 'a mode of 
interpretation but is a derivative (abkiinftiger) mode. 
In order to understand Heidegger's notion of assertion, 
we must thus understand his notion of interpretation 
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generally. Heidegger calls interpretation "the working 
out of possibilities projected in understanding" (BT 
189). These possibilities constitute, roughly speak-
ing, a relational space or world in which Dasein always 
already finds itself. Dasein exists as thrown into a 
world of concern, and understands itself in terms of 
this space of possibilities. That Dasein is essenti-
ally interpretation means that Dasein is constantly 
working out the possibilities into which it has been 
thrown. In Being and Time this means that Dasein is 
the being which discovers: "That •circumspection dis-
covers' means that the 'world* which has already been 
understood comes to be interpreted" (BT 189). At the 
most fundamental level of interpretation, Dasein does 
not thematically grasp the possibilities onto which it 
projects; rather, at the level of everyday circumspec-
tion those possibilities are transparent. It is only 
at the level of assertion that Dasein's possibilities 
become explicit or thematic. 
The distinction between interpretation generally 
and apophantic interpretation is best understood in 
terms of the 'as'-structure. The 'as' is a character-
istic of all interpretation (BT 192) but has a somewhat 
different nature at different levels of interpretation. 
In our everyday dealings with things of use we are in 
some sense constantly "uncovering" or "discovering" 
those things. But in so discovering things of use we 
are not discovering them in the way in which, say, 
science discovers them; rather, we are oriented on what 
role the thing may play in the project at hand. At 
this level, things are for us "ready-to-hand": this 
means that things show themselves in a complex of ref-
erence relations with other things of use. (What I am 
referring to here as "things of use" are called 
variously "equipment" or "artifacts" by different 
translators of Heidegger.) This complex of reference 
relations is for Heidegger the structure of the world, 
and this mode of dealing with things is considered by 
him to be "more primordial" than the mode of assertion 
precisely because at this level things are just what we 
can do with them. Heidegger describes this being in 
terms of the "in order to": at the level of readiness-
to-hand, the hammer is not an object with determinate 
physical properties, but rather' is in order to hammer 
nails, and nails are in order to hold boards together, 
and so forth. At the level of readiness-to-hand a ham-
mer cannot be understood except in its relation to 
nails, boards, and the like. (This is what Heidegger 
means when he claims that there can be no such thing as 
an item of equipment, i.e., a thing of use cut off from 
the context of use. Indeed a thing of use can become 
cut off from the context of use, but then we are no 
longer viewing it in its equipmentality.) At the level 
of such circumspective dealings with equipment, where 
we take the hammer as something for nailing boards 
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together, interpretation is carried on at the level of 
the "hermeneutic 'as'." At this level we articulate 
relations between things of use which have been dis-
closed in the understanding. And since the world is 
constituted by the structure of significance (this in-
cludes the "in order to," the "towards which," and the 
"for the sake of," which form a structural heirarchy) 
interpretation at the level of the hermeneutic 'as' ar-
ticulates our understanding of the world into which we 
have been thrown. Here we can see Heidegger's funda-
mental departure from "the Greeks": Heidegger argues 
that at its most fundamental level, the hermeneutic 
level, logos is a ready-to-hand articulation and shar-
ing of meaning or significance, while he argues that 
the Greeks implicitly conceived the logos as a present-
at-hand succession of words.* In Being and Time and 
The Basic Problems of Phenomeno1ogy Heidegger claims 
that this view of language is mistaken because it pre-
supposes an agreement between representations in the 
mind and things outside the mind, an agreement which 
this view of language is powerless to explain. Heideg-
ger seeks to dissolve the problem of correspondence by 
making the ontological distinction which he says was 
missed by the Greeks, namely the distinction between 
presence-at-hand and other modes of Being (specifical-
ly, Existence and readiness-to-hand): his appeal to a 
three-fold temporal structure of human Being and to an 
internally related, ready-to-hand totality of signifi-
cations enables him to conceive Dasein and world as 
coextensive and to argue that the essence of assertion 
is discovery rather than the synthesis of nouns and 
verbs, though as we shall see interpretation on Heideg-
ger's account always involves a kind of synthesis. 
Interpretation has a circular structure insofar as 
all interpretation is guided by a three-fold fore-
structure: a discussion of the fore-structure at this 
point would take us too far afield of the issue under 
consideration, but we must note in passing that 
Dasein's interpretation is always guided by its current 
(and this means already prevailing) understanding of 
itself and its world. Dasein's interpretation is al-
ways guided by the way in which its possibilities have 
already been disclosed and articulated: Dasein is 
essentially ahead of itself (Cf. BT 191f). What this 
means concretely is that what we take some item of 
equipment as is guided by our prior understanding of 
things. 
What must be noted here is that Heidegger discusses interpretation in terms of a projective disclosure of beings in their possibility. And to the extent that dealings with beings at the level of readiness-to-hand somehow disclose those beings, Heidegger is in Being and Time committing himself to the controversial view that circumspective dealings with equipment are somehow true. 
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We have already seen that Heidegger situates as-
serting against the background of a broader notion of 
interpretation. And we have seen that at the most 
"primordial" level, interpretation involves the her-
meneutic 'as', the 'as' of concernful involvement. On 
the other hand, assertion involves the apophantic 'as', 
an 'as' which is explicit rather than implicit; and 
that what is discussed in an assertion has been "dimmed 
down" means that the object of discourse has been cut 
off from reference relations in such a way that it has 
been isolated for inspection (BT 197). What is common 
to both levels of interpretation is that all inter-
pretation involves a synthesis, which Heidegger discus-
ses in terms of the quality of Beisammen ("together"); 
that all interpretation involves the 'as' structure; 
and that all interpretation operates within the circu-
lar structure of understanding. This account of inter-
pretation might lead one to conclude that there are two 
discrete kinds of interpretation, one on the level of 
concernful dealings and the other on the level of pure 
theory; however, this is not the case. Heidegger sug-
gests that there are many gradations between interpre-
tation which is wrapped up in "concernful understand-
ing" and the level of "theoretical assertion about 
something present-at-hand" (BT 200f). There are many 
statements about the world of concern which are not 
theoretical; for example, the statement "this hammer is 
too heavy" can occur only within the context of some 
project involving a hammerer who finds the hammer "too 
heavy." 
In presenting the above anatomy of assertion, Hei-
degger says that any understanding of assertion as be-
ing essentially predication misses the genuine essence 
of assertion. Unless we view assertion as a way of 
Being-in-the-world (BT 260f) we are doomed to misunder-
stand the real essence of assertion, which is 
discovery. That is, assertion and circumspective in-
terpretation share the common essence of discovery. 
The truth of assertion lies in its Being-uncovering (BT 
261) and the truth of everyday dealings lies in their 
disclosive articulation of beings or possibilities. 
Assertions are true insofar as they discover beings 
just as they are ("so . . . wie"), and Dasein's deal-
ings are true insofar as they discover whatsoever (BT 
263). If we wonder why the tradition has equated truth 
with assertion, Heidegger will tell us that that is the 
result of the Greeks' mistakenly conceiving the logos 
as present-at-hand: " . . . the methodological basis on 
which ancient ontology arose was not a primordial one. 
The logos gets experienced as something present-at-hand 
and Interpreted as such, while at the same time the en-
tities which it points out have the meaning of 
presence-at-hand" (BT 203). And Heidegger says that 
this focus on presence caused the Greeks to miss other 
modes of Being, with the result that they and the rest 
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of the tradition go astray in attempting to charac-
terize human being and the world. The picture of "the 
Greeks," particularly of Aristotle, which emerges, is 
the following: they understood the logos as a present-
at-hand succession of words, but they viewed all truth 
(in aisthesis and noesis as well as in assertion) in 
terms of discovery and covering up. 9 
In discussing the "primordial notion of truth" in 
paragraph 44 of Being and Time, Heidegger says that 
Dasein is primarily true insofar as Dasein discovers, 
that beings are discovered in concern (Besorgen), and 
that truth is equivalent to discoveredness; and that is 
why I have suggested above that activities like hammer-
ing are "true" for Heidegger in Being and Time. There 
he calls Dasein's activity of discovering ''primarily 
true" and the discoveredness of beings "true in a sec-
ond sense" (BT 263). Furthermore, discovery and 
discoveredness of beings are grounded in the disclosed-
ness of Dasein and world; that is, the discovery and 
articulation of beings or possibilities are grounded in 
the fact that Dasein exists as care, as always already 
in a world alongside beings. On this account, Dasein's 
disclosedness is "the most primordial phenomenon of 
truth. . . . In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness 
essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something 
disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. 
Dasein is 'in the truth'" (BT 263). 
In order to fill out this preliminary sketch of 
Heidegger's concept of truth in Being and Time, we need 
to look at a few remarks concerning authenticity. In 
paragraph 44 Heidegger refers to authentic disclosed-
ness as "the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in 
the mode of authenticity" (BT 264). This "most au-
thentic disclosedness" is ^ h e truth of existence." I 
mention these remarks in order to raise a methodologi-
cal question: If we are to pursue Heidegger's phenome-
nological project, then just what are "the things 
themselves" which we seek? Whatever they may be, one 
thing seems certain: the phenomenological investigator 
must be authentic in order to arrive at the phenomena: 
"Because Dasein has falling as its kind of Being, the 
way Dasein gets interpreted is for the most part inau-
thentically 'oriented' and does not reach the 
'essence'; for to Dasein the primordially appropriate 
ontological way of formulating questions remains 
foreign. But whenever we see something wrongly, some 
injunction as to the primordial 'idea' of the phenome-
non is revealed along with it" (BT 326). Thus it would 
seem that a "primordial" characterization of the pheno-
mena can come only in the "moment" (Augenblick) in 
which Dasein makes transparent to itself its own being 
as nullity or thrown projection, insofar as Dasein is 
essentially falling and is thus equiprimordially in the 
truth and untruth. 
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II. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 
In "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" Heidegger suggests 
that the concept of truth as aletheia underwent a 
transformation in Plato's subjection of aletheia as un-
concealedness to the idea. According to Heidegger, 
aletheia or truth for the Greeks first meant "that 
which has been wrested from concealedness."10 But in 
making the movement of paideia in the cave metaphor a 
movement toward the idea (and in particular toward the 
idea ton agathon or idea of the good), Plato turns 
around the granting relationship so that unconcealed-
ness no longer grants correctness; rather, starting 
with Plato the idea ton agathon grants unconcealedness. 
And accordingly there is a shift in the locus of truth; 
as unconcealedness, truth is a. "fundamental character-
istic of beings themselves," but as correctness truth 
becomes the "distinction of human relating to 
beings." 1 1 That is, in the shift to the idea truth is 
conceived not as "wresting beings from concealedness" 
but as orthotes or "correctness of viewing,"12 and as-
sertion becomes the "place" of truth. Heidegger 
believes that this shift gives rise to the presupposi-
tion of a totality of relations between intellectus and 
res, a presupposition which overlooks the context of 
Being (Seinszusammenhang) which grounds this totality. 
A related conclusion which Heidegger draws concern-
ing this shift is that it signals the start of meta-
physical thinking, which thinks the cause (Ursache) of 
all being as to theion or the divine (das GSttliche). 
The cave metaphor is supposed to show how man comes to 
think the essence of truth as "correctness of repre-
senting of all beings according to "ideas" and esti-
mates everything real according to "values"."1* In 
contrast to this conception of truth, Heidegger enjoins 
us to think unconcealedness as "the originating essence 
of truth,11 and maintains that "ln]o attempt to ground 
the essence of unconcealedness in 'reason' [Vernunft1, 
in 'spirit' [Geist], in 'thinking', in 'logos1^ [or] in 
some sort of 'subjectivity' can ever save the essence 
of unconcealedness."l* 
III. Heidegger's Reversal in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" 
In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Think-
ing," Heidegger takes back his claim in "Plato's Doc-
trine of Truth" that the notion of truth underwent a 
transformation in Plato. Here he says that ". 
aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of 
presence, was originally experienced only as orthotes, 
as the correctness of representations and statements. 
But then the assertion about the essential transforma-
tion of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correct-
ness, is also untenable."1* It seems that Heidegger is 
46 
brought to this shift by Paul Friedlander's argument, 
presented in a book on Plato which appeared over twenty 
years before Heidegger's "The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking," that both meanings of aletheia 
(unconcealment and correctness) were already current in 
the early Greek world.1' Friedlander shows that both 
Homer and Hesiod used the term in the sense of correct-
ness, though he diverges from Heidegger's claim that 
aletheia, first meant only correctness by referring to 
passages in the Iliad where the term is used in the 
sense of unconcealment. 
Heidegger concludes that it was a mistake to call 
aletheia in the sense of unconcealment truth: "To 
raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as 
such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. 
For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to 
call aletheia in the sense of opening, truth." 1 7 But 
this conclusion on Heidegger's part is not exactly .the 
conclusion which Friedlander draws. Friedlander argues 
that Heidegger was engaging in false etymology in 
"Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in using the "alpha priva-
tive" analysis to conclude that aletheia was a term of 
negation and originally meant "wresting from concealed-
ness." For Friedlander aletheia always meant primarily 
orthotes or correctness. But Friedlander*s main point 
is not merely one about faulty etymology; rather, his 
central criticism is much closer to Heidegger's own 
rethinking of aletheia. Friedlander argues, as does 
Ernst Tugendhat,1' that Heidegger's equating of truth 
and unconcealment subjectivizes the concept of truth: 
Heidegger's unconcealedness "certainly ought to save 
the concept of truth from modern subjectivization. But 
unconcealedness itself leads to subjectivization. . . . 
For there are not concealedness and unconcealedness 
pure and simple: (un)concealedness is nothing unless 
(un)concealed for someone."1' But Heidegger seems less 
interested in avoiding a subjectivization of the 
concept of truth than in adequately characterizing the 
relation between truth and unconcealment. He is will-
ing to grant that we have always used the term "truth" 
in the sense of correctness, but that does not in any 
way affect the claim that unconcealedness grounds or 
grants the possibility of truth as correctness. 
Already in Being and Time Heidegger conceived un-
concealedness (if only in the guise of disclosedness) 
as grounding truth as correctness. It is for this 
reason that Heidegger in a footnote to "The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" says that in 
"Plato's Doctrine of Truth" he strayed from the essen-
tial insight in Being and Time that it is inappropriate 
to translate aletheia as "truth." In the relevant pas-
sage in Being and Time, Heidegger says that the trans-
lation of the term aletheia as "truth" misses the pre-
philosophical meaning of the term for the Greeks, 
namely the meaning of the term as unconcealedness (BT 
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262). Thus the prevailing usage in the early Greek 
world is not the appropriate court of appeal for adju-
dicating the question concerning truth, for the issue 
under consideration is an ontological one, one concern-
ing the grounding relation between two phenomena. 
Thus, with Heidegger, we should want to say that un-
concealedness has always granted truth as correctness; 
on this account the Greeks explicitly understood truth 
as correctness but overlooked the condition of its 
possibility because of the self-concealing character of 
unconcealedness. This self-concealing character is the 
source of the Greeks' orientation on presence, but this 
does not mean that they had no understanding of un-
concealment; already in Being and Time Heidegger says 
that the Greeks had a pre-phenomenological understand-
ing of it, and he notes that this understanding shows 
itself in the thought of Heraclitus (BT 262). It seems 
that Heidegger himself fell prey to the self-concealing 
character of unconcealment in first attempting to 
equate aletheia and truth. 
In pondering the implications of this mistake, we 
must do more than simply bear in mind that truth is 
really correctness and that unconcealedness really 
grants truth and then move on to more pressing matters. 
The implications of Heidegger's shift must be pursued 
along two lines which are intimately related. Here I 
will simply state them briefly and leave them for the 
reader's consideration. First, we must rethink Heideg-
ger's view in Being and Time that Dasein's Being is 
"true" and that the concernful manipulation of things 
of use is also true: it seems wrong to call activities 
like hammering "true," and perhaps hybristic to call 
Dasein's finite disclosedness "primordially true." 
Surely Heidegger always wanted to relativize truth to 
human being, but Heidegger seems to have gone too far 
in Being and Time by making the clearing—the open 
space within which beings can come to presence—coin-
cide with Dasein's disclosedness. So we must rethink 
the relation between unconcealment and disclosedness. 
Second, we must rethink the clearing itself as an 
"event" (Ereignis) which has a divine dimension and 
which thus is not limited to human disclosedness. But 
even the talk of gods in the later essays of Vortrage 
und Aufsatze, while marking a sharp departure from 
Heidegger's former conception of clearing as disclosed-
ness, remains very obscure. If we take the so-called 
"later" Heidegger seriously, then the task of thinking 
lies precisely in bringing the clearing in the sense of 
Ereignis to language and preserving it; in so doing, we 
are to begin to understand the essence of humanity and 
its relation to Being. And this is a task which lies 
before us. 
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